Свойство:Текст иноязычной цитаты
Материал из Два града
Это свойство типа Текст.
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Современник Лурии Mordecai Jaffe учил, что «the shemittah of Din («judgment») began precisely at the time of the giving of the Torah, while everything that preceded it still belonged to the end of the shemittah of Hesed («lovingkindness»).
Затем то же у саббатианцев. +
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How can we, as human beings, get out of the socially dominant lie of existence (Existenzluge)?.. The phenomenon of the lie of existence is a phenomenon in history… That existence in the agnoia, in the alethos pseudos, is not "the nature of man, " but a pneumopathological situation… That the phenomenon has emerged in the history of humanity more than once and has been thoroughly investigated… (That) its contemporary social-dominance is bound up with (a) deliberate ignoring of history… That everyone is personally responsible for the order of his existence—historical social-dominance does not have normative force, and cannot be used as an excuse for dishonest existence… That the lie of existence is a social power which heavily burdens each of us and threatens each with lasting spiritual deformation (Plato, Politeia II: perversion of reality (from truth to lie): the motivation for the dialogue)… That resistance to a social power of such great order demands a corresponding measure of spiritual passion, intellectual discipline, and hard study (and) that the recognition of these demands is the first step — but no more than the first step—in order to get out of the lie of existence. Recognition of the existential-ethical demands as an intellectual achievement is not enough — it must be followed by the passionate work of daily resistance against the lie of existence — the work is lifelong. +
The third symbol, sometimes blending into the second, is that of the prophet of the new age. In order to lend validity and conviction to the idea of a final Third Realm, the course of history as an intelligible, meaningful whole must be assumed accessible to human knowledge, either through a direct revelation or through speculative gnosis. Hence, the Gnostic prophet or, in the later stages of secularization, the Gnostic intellectual becomes an appurtenance of modern civilization. Joachim himself is the first instance of the species. +
The attention must rather concentrate on what the thinkers achieved by their fallacious construction. On this point there is no doubt. They achieved a certainty about the meaning of his- tory, and about their own place in it, which otherwise they would not have had. Certainties, now, are in demand for the purpose of overcoming uncertainties with their accompaniment of anxiety; and the next question then would be: What specific uncertainty was so disturbing that it had to be overcome by the dubious means of fallacious immanentization? One does not have to look far afield for an answer. Uncertainty is the very essence of Christianity. The feeling of security in a «world full of gods» is lost with the gods themselves; when the world is de-divinized, communication with the world-transcendent God is reduced to the tenuous bond of faith, in the sense of Heb. 11:1, as the substance of things hoped for and the proof of things unseen. Ontologically, the substance of things hoped for is nowhere to be found but in faith itself; and, epistemologically, there is no proof for things unseen but again this very faith. The bond is tenuous, indeed, and it may snap easily. The life of the soul in openness toward God, the waiting, the periods of aridity and dulness, guilt and despondency, contrition and repentance, forsakenness and hope against hope, the silent stirrings of love and grace, trembling on the verge of a certainty which if gained is loss — the very lightness of this fabric may prove too heavy a burden for men who lust for massiv Ay possessive experience. +
The second point to be considered will be the program of the revolutionaries for the organization of society after the old world has been made new by their efforts. As a rule, Gnos- tics are not very explicit on this point. The new, transfigured world is supposed to be free of the evils of the old world; and the description will, therefore, ordinarily indulge in negations of the present grievances. The «glimpse» of Zion’s glory is a category of Gnostic description rather than the title of a ran- dom pamphlet. The «glimpse» will typically reveal a state of prosperity and abundance, a minimum of work, and the aboli- tion of governmental compulsion; and as an entertainment of rather common appeal there may be thrown in some maltreat- ment of members of the former upper class. Beyond such glimpses the description usually peters out; and the better thinkers among Gnostic revolutionaries, as, for instance, Marx and Engels, justify their reticence with the argument // that one cannot say much about institutions of a transfigured society because we have no present experience of social re- lations under the condition of a transfigured nature of man. Fortunately, there is extant a Puritan document concerning the organization of the new world, in the form of the Queries di- rected by a group of Fifth Monarchy men to Lord Fairfax.10 At the time of the Queries, in 1649, the revolution was well under way; it had reached a stage corresponding to the stage of the Russian Revolution at which Lenin wrote about the «next tasks.» In a similar manner one of the queries is phrased: «What then is the present interest of the Saints and people of God?» The reply advises that the Saints should asso- ciate in church societies and corporations according to the Congregational way; when enough such congregations have grown, they should combine into general assemblies or church parliaments according to the Presbyterian way; «and then shall God give them authority and rule over the nations and kingdoms of the world.» Since this will be a spiritual king- dom, it cannot be established «by human power and authority.» The Spirit itself will call and gather a people «and form them into several less families, churches and corporations»; and only when these spiritual nucleuses have sufficiently mul- tiplied shall they «rule the world» through assemblies «of such officers of Christ, and representatives of the churches, as they shall choose and delegate.» It all sounds comparatively harmless and harmonious; the worst that can happen will be some disillusionment when the Spirit takes its time in animat- ing the new world. As a matter of fact the affair is not quite so harmless. The Saints present their Queries to the Lord General of the Army and to the General Council of War. Under these conditions the formula that God will give the Saints «authority and rule over the nations and kingdoms of the world» sounds a dis- turbing note. One may ask: Who are these nations and king- doms of the world over whom the Saints will rule? Are they the nations and kingdoms of the old world? But in that case we would, not yet be in the new world. And when we are in the new world-over whom could the Saints rule except them- selves? Or will there be some miscreant old-world nations left whom the Saints can bully at their ease in order to add flavor to their new ruling position? In brief: the shape of things to come looks very much like what later Gnostics call the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The suspicion is confirmed by further details. The Queries distinguish between «officers of Christ» and . «Christian magistrates.» The rule of the spirit will put down all worldly rule, including the rule of the Christian magistrates of Eng- land. The distinction is the best evidence that in revolutions of the Puritan variety, indeed, two types of truth are strug- gling for existential representation. The Queries accord the name of Christianity to both types of truth, but the types are so radically different that they represent the worlds of dark- ness and light, respectively. The Puritan victory may preserve the structure of the world, including the parliamentary insti- tutions of England, but the animating spirit will have radi- cally changed. And this radical change will express itself po- litically in the radical change of the ruling personnel. The pe- titioners ask persuasively: «Consider whether it be not a far greater honour for parliaments, magistrates, etc., to rule as Christ’s officers and the churches' representatives than as of- ficers of a worldly kingdom and representatives of a mere nat- ural and worldly people?» It is not enough to be a Christian representative of the English people in Parliament, for the people as such belong in the natural order of the old world; the member of Parliament must represent the Saints and the communities of the new kingdom which are informed by the Spirit itself. Hence, the old political ruling group must be // eliminated for «what right or claim have mere natural and worldly men to rule and government, that want a sanctified claim to the least outward blessings?» And even more pointedly: «How can the kingdom be the Saints' when the ungodly are electors, and elected to govern?» The attitude is uncompromising. If we expect new heavens and a new earth, «how
then can it be lawful to patch up the old worldly government?» The only righteous course will be the one that results in «suppressing the enemies of godliness for ever.» No elaborate interpretation is necessary. A few modernizations of language are sufficient to bringxu the meaning of these suggestions. The historical order of the people is broken by the rise of a movement which does not belong to «this world.» Social evils cannot be reformed by legislation; defects of governmental machinery cannot be repaired by changes
in the constitution; differences of opinion cannot be settled by compromise. «This world» is darkness that must give way to the new light. Hence, coalition governments are impossible. The political figures of the old order cannot be re-elected in the
new world; and the men who are not members of the movement will be deprived of their right to vote in the new order.
All these changes will arrive substantially through the «Spirit» or, as Gnostics would say today, through the dialectics of history; but in political procedure the saintly comrades will take a hand, and the hand will be well armed. If the personnel of the old order should not disappear with a smile, the enemies of godliness will be suppressed or, in contemporary language, will be purged. In the Queries the realization of the new world
has reached the stage at which, in the Russian Revolution, Lenin wrote his reflections under the coquettish title, «Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?» They will, indeed; and nobody will share it with them. The new kingdom will be universal in substance as well as universal in its claim to dominion; it will extend «to all persons and things universally.» The revolution of the Gnostics has for its aim the monopoly of existential representation. The Saints can foresee that the universalism of their claim will not be accepted without a struggle by the world of darkness but that it will produce an equally universal alliance of the world against them. The Saints, therefore, will have to com- bine «against the Antichristian powers of the world»; and the Antichristian powers in their turn will «combine against them universally.» The two worlds which are supposed to follow each other chronologically will, thus, become in his- torical reality two universal armed camps engaged in a death struggle against each other. From the Gnostic mysticism of the two worlds emerges the pattern of the universal wars that has come to dominate the twentieth century. The universalism of the Gnostic revolutionary produces the universal alliance against him.
Weber, as an educator, could rely only on shame (the Aristotelian aidos) in the student as the sentiment that would induce rational consideration. But what if the student was beyond shame? If the appeal to his sense of responsibility would only make him uncomfortable without producing a change of attitude? Or if it would not even make him uncomfortable but rather fall back on what Weber called an "ethics of intention" (Gesinnungsethik), that is, on the thesis that his creed contained its own justification, that the consequences did not matter if the intention of action was right? +
In the Gnostic dream world, on the other hand, nonrecognition of reality is the first principle. As a consequence, types of action which in the real world would be considered as morally insane because of the real effects which they have will be considered moral in the dream world because they intended an entirely different effect. The gap between intended and real effect will be imputed not to the Gnostic immorality of ignoring the structure of reality but to the immorality of some other person or society that does not behave as it should behave according to the dream conception of cause and effect. +
When the immediate spiritual experiences have dried up, and when the tradition of faith and morals has lost its hold, the refoundation of morals is dominated by the symbol of an inversion of direction. The orientation toward a transcendental reality is inverted and a new foundation is sought in the direction of the somatic basis of existence. +
In the conflict with the Christian tradition the new religiousness expresses itself through the inversion of the direction in which the realissimum of existence is to be sought. The new attitude had become visible by the time of Hobbes when the orientation toward a summum bonum was replaced by the flight from the summum malum of death in civil war. The inversion of direction becomes now established, under the title of genealogy, as the principal instrument for interpreting the internal order of human nature. Whether it be the materialistic, the sensualistic, or the hedonistic variants-the strata of human nature are interpreted genetically as derivatives of a physical or biological substance at the bottom of existence. The internal structure of man is no longer ordered toward a transcendental aim but is to be explained by the operations of physical sensibility or of a pleasure-pain mechanism. This inversion of direction becomes from now on the symbol of the anti-Christian anthropology in politics-whether it assumes the form of economic materialism, or of biologism, or of psychologism. With the most important inversion, the inversion of Hegel's idealism by Marx, we shall have to deal in some detail in a later context. <br>
The inversion of direction is accompanied by the perversion of the idea of order: the disorder of passions is accepted as the normal order of the human soul. The problem of perversion as such is of long standing. As far back as in the Policraticus of John of Salisbury, one can observe an incipient psychology of the homo politicus, the man of secular passion, as the normal type of man. The problem is realized in its full importance in the seventeenth century by Hobbes and Pascal. To the madness of the inflated ego Hobbes finds the practical answer of crushing the proud by the Leviathan; Pascal tries to awaken the insight into the life of passion as divertissement and counsels the return to a life in communion with God. Both analysts of the disorder of passion still recognize the disorder as such - though in Hobbes we already see the dangerous attempt to replace the spiritual process of contrition by the external process of submission to governmental power. Helvetius resumes the analysis of passion but in his treatment the passions have lost their character as a source of disorder in the soul and have become the fundamental force on which all order in the conduct of man has to rely. The return to the ground of existence and to the experience of creaturely nothingness have lost their function in the order of the soul.
Problems of this kind repeatedly show up in // certain political situations, and indeed always do so when losses of reality take place and language in its real function as the mediator between thinking man and reality is hollowed out into a given mold, which has its own peculiar structure and therefore is no longer related to reality—that is to say, when language itself becomes a second reality within which one operates, without having the relation to first reality. +
If language speaks, then the contact between thinking and language and between object and reality is interrupted, and these problems arise because one is no longer thinking in relation to reality. +
The worldview takes the place of reality. The worldview is the expression of a systematic refusal to apperceive reality (Apperzeptionsverweigerung). The one who represents a worldview is beyond rational discussion. The refusal to apperceive reality is, not sheer ignorance, but a deliberate desire not to understand. A worldview is a concupiscent fantasy. A worldview can apply to every sector of reality, for example to sexuality and eroticism (a particularly interesting phenomenon), but also to the areas of law, language, and order in general. In all of these areas, the worldview can produce constructs in conflict with reality. +
The cliché of collective guilt becomes an alibi in two respects. First, one can accept the cliché of collective guilt, which then expresses itself in an extremely obliging burrowing into the past, in the investigation of all the atrocities that have occurred. This is carried out under the heading of contemporary history, which is another of these clichés, since there is no such thing as contemporary history. There is only an ordinary history. What is going on under the heading of contemporary history is a kind of exhibitionism with the emotional aim of an exoneration by means of a generous exhibiting of past atrocities—that is, through a mastering in the sense of the cliché, which means then that the unearthing of all that happened under National Socialism is by no means a mastering of the past. It is quite the contrary: the attempt not to master the present by always talking only of those things that have already happened and that cannot be changed anyway, whereas what should be changed is our attitude in the present. So the excessively detailed investigation of the past is one of the alibi procedures in order not to master the present because one blames the past with the guilt one really should deal with in the present.<br>
The other method is the rejection of a collective guilt for the past, again with the ulterior motive of refusing to master the present: One is not responsible for what happened in the past but is, however, by no means prepared to do what one should do in order to master the present. +
Justinian formulated the authority of the ruler as resting on three factors. He must be the emperor, in order to maintain internal order and to defend the empire externally. That is the power factor as source of authority for the ruler. But second (I am still referring to Justinian), the ruler must be the religiosissimus iuris,3 the man who administers the law with religious conscientiousness, whereby «law» is understood as law in the classical sense, that is, the justice of action in society — that is to say, substantial justice, not the content of positive law, which can be extremely unjust. That is the (second) source: reason. This formulation always has its origin in justitia, that is, an intellectual virtue, and in the ius, as a practical virtue of the ruler’s. The third source of authority is the spirit—for Justinian, in the form of revelation—and the ruler must be the defensor fidei, the defender of the faith. Power, reason, and spirit are the three sources of authority that have become historically differentiated as such. +
The fool, in Hebrew the nabal, who because of his folly, nebala, creates disorder in the society, is the man who is not a believer, in the Israelite terms of revelation. The amathes, the irrationally ignorant man, is for Plato the man who just does not have the authority of reason or who cannot bow to it. The stultus for Thomas is the fool, in the same sense as the amathia of Plato and the nebala of the Israelite prophets. This stultus now has suffered // loss of reality and acts on the basis of a defective image of reality and thereby creates disorder. +
The philosopher is compactly the man who resists the sophist; the man who attempts to develop right order in his soul through resistance to the diseased soul of the sophist; the man who can evoke a paradigm of right social order in the image of his well-ordered soul, in opposition to the disorder of society that reflects the disorder of the sophist’s soul; the man who develops the conceptual instruments for the diagnosis of health and disease in the soul; the man who develops the criteria of right order, relying on the divine measure to which his soul is attuned; the man who, as a consequence, becomes the philosopher in the narrower sense of the thinker who advances propositions concerning right order in the soul and society, claiming for them the objectivity of episteme, of science — a claim that is bitterly disputed by the sophist whose soul is attuned to the opinion of society. +
What interests me most is the fact that you have hit on the problem at all. And I respond to your excitement and bewilderment of the moment with feelings that are mixed of compassion and grim amusement. I would not complain too much about the time lost. We all lose time, for we have to disengage ourselves from the creeds of a dying world (I have lost more years than I care to remember with Neo-Kantianism and Phaenomenology, before I dropped the nonsense): and I am not so sure that the time is really lost, for if you have found the right way yourself you are much surer of it than you would be if somebody had placed you on it right from the beginning. Nor would I be too much impressed by the problem of «getting» anywhere, and especially of «getting a hearing.» You probably will soon find that you have more company in our time than you would have suspected (though not among your colleagues in the profession). Besides, the world in which you would get a «hearing» is a dying world-and who wants to be dead? Moreover, worlds are always dying-life begins with the Exodus from the civilizational realm of the dead, and the beginning begins with the discovery of the world as the Desert-if I may use wellknown symbols. Your situation at the moment may be somewhat awkward; but I am afraid I cannot pity you; you will come out allright.
Nevertheless, you are right with your remark about «strategies.»
The over-all strategy in this situation is a rather simple one: to know so much more, in a plain technical sense, than the others that they will be afraid to molest you. In detail, you will probably soon discover what I have discovered, that it is a lot of fun to bait the ungodly when they get impertinent. Fortunately, they are men just like us; and they have a conscience, though a bad one; and if one knows the touchy points of their conscience, one can make them hopping mad. You will find the touchy points soon…
I enclose the reprint of a little controversy I had recently, that will illustrate what I meant by having «fun» with the ideologues. The good lady who was the subject of my critique was so disturbed by it, that she wrote a whole article clarifying her point after a fashion in a more recent issue of the same periodical.
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All these separations and gaps shall be taken up and hook'd and link'd together,
The whole earth, this cold, impassive, voiceless earth, shall be completely justified,
Trinitas divine shall be gloriously accomplish'd and compacted by the true son of God, the poet,
(He shall indeed pass the straits and conquer the mountains,
He shall double the cape of Good Hope to some purpose,)
Nature and Man shall be disjoin'd and diffused no more,
The true son of God shall absolutely fuse them. +
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XXIV Neque enim nos Christianos quosdam imperatores ideo felices dicimus, quia uel diutius imperarunt uel imperantes filios morte placida reliquerunt, uel hostes rei publicae domuerunt uel inimicos ciues aduersus se insurgentes et cauere et opprimere potuerunt. Haec et alia uitae huius aerumnosae uel munera uel solacia quidam etiam cultores daemonum accipere meruerunt, qui non pertinent ad regnum Dei, quo pertinent isti; et hoc ipsius misericordia factum est,neabillo ista qui in eum crederent uelut summa bona desiderarent. Sed felices eos dicimus, si iuste imperant, si inter linguas sublimiter honorantium et obsequia nimis humiliter salutantium non extolluntur, et se homines esse meminerunt; si suam potestatem ad Dei cultum maxime dilatandum maiestati eius famulam faciunt; si Deum timent diligunt colunt; si plus amant illud regnum, ubi non timent habere consortes; si tardius uindicant, facile ignoscunt; si eandem uindictam pro necessitate regendae tuendaeque rei publicae, non pro saturandis inimicitiarum odiis exerunt;si eandem uemam non ad inpunitatem iniquitatis, sed ad spem correctionis indulgent; si, quod aspere coguntur plerumque decernere, misericordiae lenitate et beneficiorum largitate compensant; si luxuria tanto eis est castigatior, quanto po sset esse liberior; si malunt cupiditatibus prauls quam qulbuslibet gentibus imperare et si haec olnnia faciunt non propter ardorem inanis gloriae, sed propter caritatem felicitatis aeternae; si prosuis peccatis humilitatis et miserationis et orationis sacrificium Deo suo uero immolare non neglegunt. Tales Christianos imperatores dicimus esse felices interim spe,postea re ipsa futuros, cum id quod expectamus aduenerit.
XXV Nam bonus Deus, ne homines, qui eum crederent propter aeternam uitam colendum, has sublimitates et regna terrena existimarent posse neminem consequi, nisi daemonibus supplicet, quod hi spiritus in talibus multum ualerent, Constantinum imperatorem non supplicantem daemonibus, sed ipsum uerum Deum colentem tantis terrenis impleuit muneribus. quanta optare nullus auderet; cui etiam condere ciuitatem Romano imperio sociam, uelut ipsius Romae filiam, sed sine aliquo daemonum templo simulacroque concessit. Diu imperauit, uniuersum orbem Romanum unus Augustus tenuit et defendit; in administrandis et gerendis bellis uictoriosissimus fuit, in tyrannis opprimendis per omnia prosperatus est, grandaeuus aegritudine et senectute defunctus est, filios imperantes reliquit. Sed rursus ne imperator quisquam ideo Christianus esset, ut felicitatem Constantini mereretur, cum propter uitam aeternam quisque debeat esse Christianus: Iouianum multo citius quam Iulianum abstulit; Gratianum ferro tyrannico permisit interimi, longe quidem mitius quam magnum Pompeium in colentem uelut Romanos deos. Nam ille uindicari a Catone non potuit, quem ciuilis belli quodam modo heredem reliquerat; iste autem, quamuis piae animae solacia talia non requirant, a Theodosio uindicatus est, quem regni participem fecerat, cum paruulum haberet fratrem auidior fidae societatis quam nimiae potestatis.
XXVI Vnde et ille non solum uiuo seruauit quam debebat fidem, uerum etiam post eius mortem pulsum ab eius interfectore Maximo Valentinianum eius paruulum fratrem in sui partes imperii tamquam Christianus excepit pupillum, paterno custodiuit affectu, quem destitutum omnibus opibus nullo negotio posset auferre, si latius regnandi cupiditate magis quam benefaciendi caritate flagraret; unde potius eum seruata eius imperatoria dignitate susceptum ipsa humanitate et gratia consolatus est. Deinde cum Maximum terribilem faceret ille successus, hic in angustiis curarum suarum non est lapsus ad curiositates sacrilegas atque inlicitas, sed ad Iohannem in Aegypti heremo constitutum, quem Dei seruum prophetandi spiritu praeditum fama crebrescente didicerat, misit atque ab eo nuntium uictoriae certissimum accepit. Mox tyranni Maximi extinctor Valentinianum puerum imperii sui partibus, unde fugatus fuerat, cum misericordissima ueneratione restituit, eoque siue per insidias siue quo alio pacto uel casu proxime extincto alium tyrannum Eugenium, qui in illius imperatoris locum non legitime fuerat subrogatus, accepto rursus prophetico responso fide certus oppressit, contra cuius robustissimum exercitum magis orando quam feriendo pugnauit. Milites nobis qui aderant rettulerunt extorta sibi esse de manibus quaecumque iaculabantur, cum a Theodosii partibus in aduersarios uehemens uentus iret et non solum quaecumque in eos iaciebantur concitatissime raperet, uerum etiam ipsorum tela in eorum corpora retorqueret. Vnde et poeta Claudianus, quamuis a Christi nomine alienus, in eius tamen laudibus dixit:
O nimium dilecte Deo, cui militat aether,
Et coniurati ueniunt ad classica uenti! Victor autem, sicut crediderat et praedixerat, Iouis simulacra, quae aduersus eum fuerant nescio quibus ritibus uelut, consecrata et in Alpibus constituta, deposuit, eorumque fulmina, quod aurea fuissent, iocantibus (quod illa laetitia permittebat) cursoribus et se ab eis fulminari uelle dicentibus hilariter benigneque donauit. Inimicorum suorum filios, quos, non ipsius iussu, belli abstulerat impetus, etiam nondum Christianos ad ecclesiam confugientes, Christianos hac occasione fieri uoluit et Christiana caritate dilexit, nec priuauit rebus et auxit honoribus. In neminem post uictoriam priuatas inimicitias ualere permisit. Bella ciuilia non sicut Cinna et Marius et Sulla et alii tales nec finita finire uoluerunt, sed magis doluit exorta quam cuiquam nocere uoluit terminata. Inter haec omnia ex ipso initio imperii sui non quieuit iustissimis et misericordissimis legibus aduersus impios laboranti ecclesiae subuenire, quam Valens haereticus fauens Arrianis uehementer adflixerat; cuius ecclesiae se membrum esse magis quam in terris regnare gaudebat. Simulacra gentilium ubique euertenda praecepit, satis intellegens nec terrena munera in daemoniorum, sed in Dei ueri esse posita potestate. Quid autem fuit eius religiosa humilitate mirabilius, quando in Thessalonicensium grauissimum scelus, cui iam episcopis intercedentibus promiserat indulgentiam, tumultu quorundam, qui ei cohaerebant, uindicare compulsus est et ecclesiastica cohercitus disciplina sic egit paenitentiam, ut imperatoriam celsitudinem pro illo populus orans magis fleret uidendo prostratam, quam peccando timeret iratam? Haec ille secum et si qua similia, quae commemorare longum est, bona opera tulit ex isto temporali uapore cuiuslibet culminis et sublimitatis humanae; quorum operum merces est aeterna felicitas, cuius dator est Deus solis ueraciter piis. Cetera uero uitae huius uel fastigia uel subsidia, sicut ipsum mundum lucem auras, terras aquas fructus ipsiusque hominis animam corpus, sensus mentem uitam, bonis malisque largitur; in quibus est etiam quaelibet imperii magnitudo, quam pro temporum gubernatione dispensat.
Non modo quaerimus utrum sit factum, sed utrum fuerit faciendum. Sana quippe ratio etiam exemplis anteponenda est, cui quidem et exempla concordant, sed illa, quae tanto digniora sunt imitatione, quanto excellentiora pietate. +
